The 1964 theorem of John Bell shows that no model that reproduces the predictions of quantum mechanics can simultaneously satisfy the assumptions of locality and determinism. On the other hand, the assumptions of signal locality plus predictability are also sufficient to derive Bell inequalities. This simple theorem, previously noted but published only relatively recently by Masanes, Acin and Gisin, has fundamental implications not entirely appreciated. Firstly, nothing can be concluded about the ontological assumptions of locality or determinism independently of each (...) other—it is possible to reproduce quantum mechanics with deterministic models that violate locality as well as indeterministic models that satisfy locality. On the other hand, the operational assumption of signal locality is an empirically testable (and well-tested) consequence of relativity. Thus Bell inequality violations imply that we can trust that some events are fundamentally unpredictable, even if we cannot trust that they are indeterministic. This result grounds the quantum-mechanical prohibition of arbitrarily accurate predictions on the assumption of no superluminal signalling, regardless of any postulates of quantum mechanics. It also sheds a new light on an early stage of the historical debate between Einstein and Bohr. (shrink)

This book recalls, for nonscientific readers, the history of quantum mechanics, the main points of its interpretation, and Einstein's objections to it, together with the responses engendered by his arguments. We point out that most popular discussions on the strange aspects of quantum mechanics ignore the fundamental fact that Einstein was correct in his insistence that the theory does not directly describe reality. While that fact does not remove these counterintuitive features, it casts them in a different light."--page vi.

H.B.G. Casimir's life, interests and works are intertwined with the important developments that have taken place in physics during this century. This book was compiled by his friends and admirers in honour of his 80th birthday and concentrates mainly on Casimir's achievements in the field of physics, though without ignoring the peripheral areas of the history and philosophy of physics in which he was greatly interested. The book is divided into four parts. Part I describes Casimir's teachers, Ehrenfest, Bohr and (...) Pauli, and will be of general interest due to the key role which these physicists played in modern developments. The articles do give new facts and provide new insights into the history of modern physics. Part II consists of essays on recent developments in various areas of physics in which Casimir has taken an active interest, such as the modern concept of time, statistical foundations of electrodynamic theory and field theory. The subjects covered in Part III have been selected because of Casimir's efforts in the industrial research area of physics. They cover past, present and future expectations in research. (shrink)

Quantum mechanics, which describes the behavior of subatomic particles, seems to challenge common sense. Waves behave like particles; particles behave like waves. You can tell where a particle is, but not how fast it is moving--or vice versa. An electron faced with two tiny holes will travel through both at the same time, rather than one or the other. And then there is the enigma of creation ex nihilo, in which small particles appear with their so-called antiparticles, only to disappear (...) the next instant in a tiny puff of energy. Since its inception, physicists and philosophers have struggled to work out the meaning of quantum mechanics. Some, like Niels Bohr, have responded to quantum mechanics' mysteries by replacing notions of position and velocity with probabilities. Others, like Einstein and Penrose, have disagreed and think that the entire puzzle reflects not a fundamental principle of nature but our own ignorance of basic scientific processes. Sneaking a Look at God's Cards offers the general reader a deep and real understanding of the problems inherent to the interpretation of quantum mechanics, from its inception to the present. The book presents a balanced overview of current debates and explores how the theory of quantum mechanics plays itself out in the real world. Written from the perspective of a leading European physicist, the book looks extensively at ideas from both sides of the Atlantic and also considers what philosophers have contributed to the scientific discussion of this field. Sneaking a Look at God's Cards sets out what we know about the endlessly fascinating quantum world, how we came to this understanding, where we disagree, and where we are heading in our quest to comprehend the seemingly incomprehensible. (shrink)

In 1916, Einstein rederived the blackbody radiation law of Planck that originated the idea of quantized energy one hundred years ago. For this purpose, Einstein introduced the concept of transition probability, which had a profound influence on the development of quantum theory. In this article, we adopt Einstein's assumptions with two exceptions and seek the statistical condition for the thermal equilibrium of matter without referring to the inner details of either statistical thermodynamics or quantum theory. It is shown that the (...) conditions of thermodynamic equilibrium of electromagnetic radiation and the energy balance of thermal radiation by the matter, between any of its two energy-states, not only result in Planck's radiation law and the Bohr frequency condition, but they remarkably yield the law of the statistical thermal equilibrium of matter: the Maxwell–Boltzmann distribution. Since the transition probabilities of the modern quantum theory of radiation coincide with their definition in Einstein's theory of blackbody radiation, the presented deduction of the Maxwell–Boltzmann distribution is equally valid within the bounds of modern quantum theory. Consequently, within the framework of the fundamental assumptions, the Maxwell–Boltzmann distribution of energy-states is not only a sufficient, but a necessary condition for thermal equilibrium between the matter and radiation. (shrink)

We present a kind of logic named multideductive logic and outline an application of it in the problem of theoretic-formal unification of physical theories dealing with the Bohr atom theory. This is just a preliminary study that will be developed in future papers.

When Wittgenstein moved from Manchester to Cambridge he was following a path from the study of the natural sciences to the study of philosophy which was then not unusual, and has since become increasingly common. Russell had preceded him in that intellectual emigration and many more were to follow. Of the three philosophy departments I have been in, two were headed by natural scientists . Both my research supervisors in philosophy were natural scientists . Less surprising, but still significant, a (...) considerable proportion of Presidents of the British Society for the Philosophy of Science were originally trained as natural scientists. Yet it is a subject still unrecognized by the Royal Society. The editors of both the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science and the journal Analysis were both originally natural scientists. Eminent scientists seem to feel impelled to discuss there own subjects in a wider context of philosophy. Bohr, Schrodinger, Kilmister, Hoyle, Hawking and Penrose, are but a few from a long list. (shrink)

SummaryIt is not the inconsistency in the sense of classical logic that we have to tolerate. The dialectical reasoning, described by N. Rescher, is outside the domain where CI is defined. The apparent contradiction between CI and paraconsistent logic can be removed by realizing that PL is a widening of the conceptual framework of classical logic. In this new framework the meaning of some words was changed similarly as, according to N. Bohr, in quantum mechanics the words “particle” and “wave” (...) have changed their meaning. (shrink)

1. Introduction : humanity's urge to understand -- 2. Elements of scientific thinking : skepticism, careful reasoning, and exhaustive evaluation are all vital. Science Is universal -- Maintaining a critical attitude. Reasonable skepticism -- Respect for the truth -- Reasoning. Deduction -- Induction -- Paradigm shifts -- Evaluating scientific hypotheses. Ockham's razor -- Quantitative evaluation -- Verification by others -- Statistics : correlation and causation -- Statistics : the indeterminacy of the small -- Careful definition -- Science at the frontier. (...) When good theories become ugly -- Stuff that just does not fit -- 3. Christopher Columbus and the discovery of the "Indies" : it can be disastrous to stubbornly refuse to recognize that you have falsified your own hypothesis -- 4. Antoine Lavoisier and Joseph Priestley both test the befuddling phlogiston theory : junking a confusing hypothesis may be necessary to clear the way for new and productive science -- 5. Michael Faraday discovers electromagnetic induction but fails to unify electromagnetism and gravitation : it is usually productive to simplify and consolidate your hypotheses -- 6. Wilhelm Röntgen intended to study cathode rays but ended up discovering X-rays : listen carefully when Mother Nature whispers in your ear : she may be leading you to a Nobel Prize -- 7. Max Planck, the first superhero of quantum theory, saves the universe from the ultraviolet catastrophe : assemble two flawed hypotheses about a key phenomenon into a model that fits experiment exactly and people will listen to you even if you must revolutionize physics -- 8. Albert Einstein attacks the problem "Are atoms real?" from every angle : solving a centuries-old riddle in seven different ways can finally resolve it -- 9. Niels Bohr models the hydrogen atom as a quantized system with compelling exactness, but his later career proves that collaboration and developing new talent can become more significant than the groundbreaking research of any individual -- 10. Conclusions, status of science, and lessons for our time. Conclusions from our biographies -- What thought processes lead to innovation? -- Is the scientist an outsider? -- The status of the modern scientific enterprise -- Lessons for our time -- Can the scientific method be applied to public policy? -- Why so little interest in science? -- Knowledge is never complete. (shrink)

Based on the exactly solvable case of a harmonic oscillator, we show that the direct correspondence between the Bohr-Sommerfeld phase of semiclassical quantum mechanics and the topological phase of Aharonov and Anandan is restricted to the case of a coherent state. For other Gaussian wave packets the geometric quantum phase strongly depends on the amount of squeezing.

We further develop a recent new proof (by Greenberger, Horne, and Zeilinger—GHZ) that local deterministic hidden-variable theories are inconsistent with certain strict correlations predicted by quantum mechanics. First, we generalize GHZ's proof so that it applies to factorable stochastic theories, theories in which apparatus hidden variables are causally relevant to measurement results, and theories in which the hidden variables evolve indeterministically prior to the particle-apparatus interactions. Then we adopt a more general measure-theoretic approach which requires that GHZ's argument be modified (...) in order to produce a valid proof. Finally, we motivate our more general proof's assumptions in a somewhat different way from previous authors in order to strengthen the implications of our proof as much as possible. After developing GHZ's proof along these lines, we then consider the analogue, for our proof, of Bohr's reply to the EPR argument, and conclude (pace GHZ) that in at least one respect (viz. that of most concern to Bohr) the proof is no more powerful than Bell's. Nevertheless, we point out some new advantages of our proof over Bell's, and over other algebraic proofs of nonlocality. And we conclude by giving a modified version of our proof that, like Bell's, does not rely on experimentally unrealizable strict correlations, but still leads to a testable “quasi-algebraic” locality inequality.“... to admit things not visible to the gross creatures that we are is, in my opinion, to show a decent humility, and not just a lamentable addiction to metaphysics.”J. S. Bell. (shrink)

It is shown how the development of physics has involved making explicit what were homocentric projections which had heretofore been implicit, indeed inexpressible in theory. This is shown to support a particular notion of the invariant as the real. On this basis the divergence in ideals of physical intelligibility between Bohr and Einstein is set out. This in turn leads to divergent, but explicit, conceptions of objectivity and completeness for physical theory. *I am indebted to Dr. G. McLelland. Professor F. (...) Rohrlich and an anonymous referee of this journal for several improvements in the formulation of the paper. (shrink)

A mecânica quântica instituiu uma linguagem matemática inteiramente inédita. Essa mudança na física exigiu que físicos e filósofos repensassem os conceitos pelos quais se podiam representar a realidade, uma vez que as noções clássicas se revelaram limitadas na compreensão dos fenômenos atômicos. O filósofo francês G. Bachelard e o físico alemão W. Heisenberg são autores que discorreram acerca das grandes modificações que ocorreram no seio da física, e, com isso, trataram do problema da linguagem na mecânica quântica. Neste artigo, o (...) objetivo é recorrer aos argumentos de ambos os autores para evidenciar relações entre suas ideias acerca da temática referida. Destaca-se que Bachelard e Heisenberg criticam a aplicação da linguagem usual e dos conceitos filosóficos da modernidade na nova física, mas, mediante sua noção de ruptura, o filósofo francês propõe que a mecânica quântica se restrinja à linguagem matemática. Ideia esta que vai contra ao princípio de complementaridade de Bohr, admitido por Heisenberg na compreensão dos fenômenos quânticos e para uma interpretação da física quântica. (shrink)

As an alternative for causality – which modern science found to be rather construed than objective – Jung developed his idea of synchronicity according to the demands of a modern scientific approach of nature. As I will show in the following paper, even if he promised a complementary principle of explanation, he ended by offering a principle of reality. His attempt gave birth to a pretty vast literature that links Jung’s synchronicity to Bohr’s complementarity. I will show that such a (...) connection, although not entirely groundless, should be treated with caution as long as the two approaches of reality are on completely different bases. Keywords: Jung, Bohr, causality, the measurement problem, quantum epistemology. (shrink)

The Bohr formulation—the original one—is now largely a matter of history. The usual career of a theory was its fate. It explained much, but it failed at the first signs of complication, even for the simplest molecules as hydrogen and helium. Some results were either only approximate in a loose or incomplete fashion, e.g. in the application of the correspondence principle to intensities, the only reliable predictions being only for an absence of certain lines, or they quite disagreed with experiment, (...) e.g. in the case of the hydrogen molecule and the hydrogen molecule ion, the normal and excited states of helium, the anomalous Zeeman effect, the Ramsauer effect, and in the treatment of problems where more than one electron was involved. In the last mentioned cases the perturbation method, so successful in solving “many-body” problems in celestial mechanics, failed completely because systems of several electrons, possessing frequencies of the order of light waves, cannot interact classically. A bit of much forced pragmatism was practiced in treating the many electron atom as a variation of the hydrogen atom. Besides, there were technical oddities, like ½ quantum numbers, and impenetrated anologies between visible and X-ray spectra. (shrink)

Quantum theory predicts that, e.g., in a Stern-Gerlach experiment with electrons the measured spin component $S_Z = \pm \frac{1}{2}$ does not come about by an adjustment at the last moment, a forced “flipping” or “tilting” of the spin (vector), which would imply z-angular momentum exchange between particle and instrument, but will afterward appear to have had the value $\frac{1}{2} or - \frac{1}{2}$ already before the measurement. Because an electron spin cannot have components $ \pm \frac{1}{2}$ in all directions at the (...) same time, the measuring direction has a “privileged” status before the measurement, however we choose that direction, which implies a retroactive effect. A second proof of retroactivity is derived from a special case of the paradox of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen. It is strongly suggested by our result that, in essential respects, both Bohr and Einstein were right in their famous controversy about determinism and considering microprocesses “as a whole.”. (shrink)

We wish to draw attention to an unfortunate error that appeared in ‘The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics’ by Max Born in the previous Number on p. 106, L 3, where ‘Bohr’ should of course read ‘Bohm’. We regret making the author appear to have thrown his ally, Professor Bohr, to his opponents.—Ed.Corrections for ‘A Variant to Hubert's Theory of the Foundations of Arithmetic’ by G. Kreisel in the previous Number have been received too late to be included here. They will (...) be given in the next Number. (shrink)

P. KOnig: Einleitung - P. ZIche: Idiographik und allgemeine Wissenschaftlichkeit - Windelband und die Wissenschaftsreflexion um 1900 - G. HArtung: Ein Philosoph korrigiert sich selbst - Wilhelm Windelbands Abkehr vom Relativismus - O. SChlaudt: Philosophie am Leitfaden der Empirie. WIndelbands relativistisches Programm - S. KUft: Windelbands Konzeption von Transzendentalphilosophie und ihr Bezug zur Kulturphilosophie - R. BOnito Oliva: Windelband. KUlturphilosophie und Kulturkrise - P. KOnig: Teleologie und Geschichte bei Wilhelm Windelband - J. BOhr: Im Fortschreiben der Probleme: Windelbands 19. JAhrhundert (...) - T.-H. CHang: Der Wertbegriff beiWilhelm Windelband und sein Konzept der Problemgeschichte - T. KUbalica: Die Geschichte der Philosophie als Problemgeschichte - J. MEhlich: Windelbands Praludien und das Silberne Zeitalter in Russland - G. SChluter: Windelbands italienische Kontakte und Bezugnahmen - D. STefanelli: Notizen uber Karl Vossler und die "Sudwestdeutsche Schule" - C. ZAnfi: Geschichte, Natur und Leben: Windelband und Bergson in der Historismus-Debatte - J.-I. LIndén: Der beseelte Geist: Dilthey als Kritiker der badischen Schule - H. GUndlach: Windelbands Ringen mit der Psychologie - Anhang: Wilhelm Windelband: Blaue Hefte zur Psychologie. (shrink)

Our ultimate purpose is to give an axiomatic treatment of recursion theory sufficient to develop the priority method. The direct or abstract approach is to keep in mind as clearly as possible the methods actually used in recursion theory, and then to formulate them explicitly. The indirect or experimental approach is to look first for other mathematical theories which seem similar to recursion theory, to formulate the analogies precisely, and then to search for an axiomatic treatment which covers not only (...) recursion theory but also the analogous theories as particular cases.The first approach is more general because it does not depend on the existence of analogues. A concrete mathematical theory, it seems, need have no such analogues and still be important, as e.g. classical number theory. In such a case, an axiomatic treatment may still be useful for exhibiting the mathematical structure of the theory considered and the assumptions on which it rests. However, it will lack one of the most heavily advertised advantages of the axiomatic method, namely, the “economy of thought” which results from an uniform theory for several different and interesting cases: we cannot hope for this if, by hypothesis, we know of only one particular case. In contrast, the second approach, if successful at all, is bound to achieve such “economy” because we start out with several interesting particular cases. Another possible virtue of the second approach is that of field work over insight: the abstract pattern that we are looking for and hoping to formalize in axioms, may not be evident in any one mathematical theory, but may spring to the eye if one happens to look simultaneously at several theories which happen to realize the pattern. (shrink)

An alleged moral right to informational privacy assumes that we should have control over information about ourselves. What is the philosophical justification for this control? I think that one prevalent answer to this question—an answer that has to do with the justification of negative rights generally—will not do.

In speaking of empirical science as a self-correcting process one implies that a proposition accepted in accordance with the rules of procedure may have to be eliminated later according to these very rules. Taking this for granted one realizes that a particular empirical science, say physics, should be defined in terms of rules of method rather than as a system of propositions representing our knowledge at a given time. Obviously both the science of Galileo and Newton and the science of (...) Einstein and Bohr are called ''physics'' and we do not regard this as a mere equivocation. It may, however, be objected that a definition of a science in terms of rules of method is incompatible with the view that a science consists of a set of propositions. To meet this objection I propose that we distinguish between the structure of a science as defined in terms of the rules of method and the corpus of this science at a given time, i.e., the set of propositions accepted at this time in accordance with the rules of method of this science. The relation between the structure of a science and the corpus of a science is similar to that obtaining between the structure of a legal order, e.g., American law, which is defined by the rules of the process of legislation in the broadest sense and the legal norms which are the corpus of law at a given time. It should then be noted that the assertion that a certain proposition belongs to a given science is incomplete without a time-index. The scientist changes the corpus of his science either by introducing new propositions to it or by eliminating propositions which were previously accepted and did not stand further control. The significance of whatever else he does in the course of his inquiry can be determined only in the light of this selection. There are two stages in this process of selection. The first is exclusively concerned with meanings as such. The scientist has to ascertain that a given aggregate of words represents a proposition, that this proposition contains only objective meanings, that it is not self-contradictory, that it belongs to the subject-matter of the particular science. The second phase of the selection, exhibited in scientific procedure in the strict sense, applies only to such propositions which have passed this preexamination. We shall call those rules of method in terms of which the first stage of selection is defined rules of the language of science and those rules in terms of which the second stage is defined rules of the procedure of science. In this paper I shall try to show how important it is to distinguish clearly between these two types of rules. I shall first deal with the rules of the language of science and confine myself to sciences dealing with the physical world. (shrink)

The traditional formalism of quantum mechanics is mainly used to describe ensembles of identical systems (with a density-operator formalism) or single isolated systems, but is not capable of describing single open quantum objects with many degrees of freedom showing pure-state stochastic dynamical behaviour. In particular, stochastic 'line-migration' as in single-molecule spectroscopy of defect molecules in a molecular matrix is not adequately described. Starting with the Bohr scenario of stochastic quantum jumps (between strict energy eigenstates), we try to incorporate more general (...) pure-state stochastic dynamical behaviour into the quantum mechanical formalism.Probability distributions of (approximately) pure states, arising through the stochastic pure-state dynamics for long times, give rise to appropriate decompositions of thermal density operators. These decompositions of density operators into pure states mediate between quantum mechanics for ensembles of molecules and quantum theory for single molecules (or single dressed quantum objects). We suggest that such decompositions should be consistent with infinite limits (e.g. the Born-Oppenheimer limit for infinite nuclear masses) in the sense that quantum fluctuations (around classical behaviour in the infinite limit) die out asymptotically. (shrink)

In this thesis I argue for the following theory: constitutive Russellian phenomenal bonding panpsychism. To do so I do three main things: 1) I argue for Russellian panpsychism. 2) I argue for phenomenal bonding panpsychism. 3) I defend the resultant phenomenal bonding panpsychist model. The importance of arguing for such a theory is that if it can be made to be viable, then it is proposed to be the most promising theory of the place of consciousness within nature. This is (...) because constitutive Russellian panpsychism has all the theoretical virtues of physicalism and dualism but does not face the problems they do. The combination problem, however, is the most significant problem for the Russellian panpsychist, and, hence, in order to show the viability of the theory I address this problem. Moreover, I present a novel ”mereological argument’ for panpsychism which makes it necessary that the Russellian panpsychist addresses the combination problem. The focus of this thesis is therefore addressing this problem. I argue that the combination problem can indeed be solved. To do so I argue for the phenomenal bonding solution proposed by Goff. I argue that this solution works and that we can form a positive concept of the phenomenal bonding relation. This forces the panpsychist to make sense of how experiencing subjects can be proper parts of other experiencing subjects. I then argue that this can indeed be made sense of and show that we can indeed be composite subjects made of other subjects. To show that we can be subjects made up of other subjects I defend this proposal from various objections from throughout the literature. All these objections can be responded to by the constitutive Russellian phenomenal bonding panpsychist. Ultimately this leaves us with a novel and interesting account of what conscious subjects are, and what the material world is: they are both composite entities made wholly of conscious matter. (shrink)

The centerpiece of Jeffrey Bub's book Interpreting the Quantum World is a theorem (Bub and Clifton 1996) which correlates each member of a large class of no-collapse interpretations with some 'privileged observable'. In particular, the Bub-Clifton theorem determines the unique maximal sublattice L(R,e) of propositions such that (a) elements of L(R,e) can be simultaneously determinate in state e, (b) L(R,e) contains the spectral projections of the privileged observable R, and (c) L(R,e) is picked out by R and e alone. In (...) this paper, we explore the issue of maximal determinate sets of observables using the tools provided by the algebraic approach to quantum theory; and we call the resulting algebras of determinate observables, "maximal *beable* subalgebras". The capstone of our exploration is a generalized version of Bub and Clifton's theorem that applies to arbitrary (i.e., both mixed and pure) quantum states, to Hilbert spaces of arbitrary (i.e., both finite and infinite) dimension, and to arbitrary observables (including those with a continuous spectrum). Moreover, in the special case covered by the original Bub-Clifton theorem, our theorem reproduces their result under strictly weaker assumptions. This added level of generality permits us to treat several topics that were beyond the reach of the original Bub-Clifton result. In particular: (a) We show explicitly that a (non-dynamical) version of the Bohm theory can be obtained by granting privileged status to the position observable. (b) We show that Clifton's (1995) characterization of the Kochen-Dieks modal interpretation is a corollary of our theorem in the special case when the density operator is taken as the privileged observable. (c) We show that the 'uniqueness' demonstrated by Bub and Clifton is only guaranteed in certain special cases -- viz., when the quantum state is pure, or if the privileged observable is compatible with the density operator. We also use our results to articulate a solid mathematical foundation for certain tenets of the orthodox Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory. For example, the uncertainty principle asserts that there are strict limits on the precision with which we can know, simultaneously, the position and momentum of a quantum-mechanical particle. However, the Copenhagen interpretation of this fact is not simply that a precision momentum measurement necessarily and uncontrollably disturbs the value of position, and vice-versa; but that position and momentum can never in reality be thought of as simultaneously determinate. We provide warrant for this stronger 'indeterminacy principle' by showing that there is no quantum state that assigns a sharp value to both position and momentum; and, a fortiori, that it is mathematically impossible to construct a beable algebra that contains both the position observable and the momentum observable. We also prove a generalized version of the Bub-Clifton theorem that applies to "singular" states (i.e., states that arise from non-countably-additive probability measures, such as Dirac delta functions). This result allows us to provide a mathematically rigorous reconstruction of Bohr's response to the original EPR argument -- which makes use of a singular state. In particular, we show that if the position of the first particle is privileged (e.g., as Bohr would do in a position measuring context), the position of the second particle acquires a definite value by virtue of lying in the corresponding maximal beable subalgebra. But then (by the indeterminacy principle) the momentum of the second particle is not a beable; and EPR's argument for the simultaneous reality of both position and momentum is undercut. (shrink)

This article discusses the concept of God with a focus on the translation of God in the Chinese and Yoruba religious contexts. Translating the word God is of the essence when comparing concepts of god. The translation of the Christian God as Olodumare misrepresents the latter. As suggested by Africanists, there should be appropriate translations for God, Olodumare, and other African gods. As a preliminary comparative attempt, this article presents a case on the introduction of God to the Chinese people. (...) The translation of God into Chinese reflects different views regarding the correlation between the Christian God and the Chinese gods. (shrink)

Like all research, embryo research can take a variety of forms, some posing substantially more risks to persons than others. Savulescu et al argue persuasively that regulatory regimes specially designed for sensitive embryo research should differentiate between person-affecting and non-person-affecting embryo research, with substantial scrutiny only warranted for the former.1 Yet if we find Savulescu et al ’s argument persuasive, what practical implications would it have? In this commentary, we focus in particular on how such an argument might apply in (...) Singapore, one of the jurisdictions with special regulations for embryo research. We will summarise the way in which approval for oocyte and embryonic research operates in Singapore, and suggest that Savulesc et al ’s distinction requires specification to be useful in such contexts. We propose adopting a risk-stratified framework similar to that employed with Institutional Review Boards. This requires a wider view of risks than the focus by Savulescu et al on future persons. We then illustrate how such a framework would apply in five scenarios discussed in Savulescu et al. Research with embryos and oocytes is regulated in Singapore under the Human Biomedical Research Act.2 Enacted in 2015, this law sets out requirements for consent, IRB review and research oversight. By definition, all research involving gametes and embryos fall within the remit of the Act. Moreover, such research is defined as ‘restricted’; besides the Act, research involving oocytes and embryos is also subject to control under the Human Biomedical Research …. (shrink)

Medical decisions regarding end-of-life care have undergone significant changes in recent decades, driven by changes in both medicine and society. Catholic tradition in medical ethics offers clear guidance in many issues, and a moral framework accessible to those who do not share the same faith as well as to members of its faith community. In some areas, a Catholic perspective can be seen clearly and confidently, such as in teachings on the permissibility of suicide and euthanasia. In others, such as (...) withdrawal of nutrition and hydration, the Church does not yet speak with one voice and has not closed out the discussion. Yet, it is not in the teaching on individual issues that a Catholic moral tradition offers the most help and comfort, but in its account of what it means to lead a life in Christ, and to prepare for a Christian death. As in the problem of pain and suffering, it is the spiritual support more than the ethical guidance that helps both patients and physicians bear the unbearable and fathom the unfathomable. (shrink)

A generalized and unifying viewpoint to both general relativity and quantum mechanics and information is investigated. It may be described as a generaliztion of the concept of reference frame from mechanics to thermodynamics, or from a reference frame linked to an element of a system, and thus, within it, to another reference frame linked to the whole of the system or to any of other similar systems, and thus, out of it. Furthermore, the former is the viewpoint of general relativity, (...) the latter is that of quantum mechanics and information. Ciclicity in the manner of Nicolas Cusanus (Nicolas of Cusa) is complemented as a fundamental and definitive property of any totality, e.g. physically, that of the universe. It has to contain its externality within it somehow being namely the totality. This implies a seemingly paradoxical (in fact, only to common sense rather logically and mathematically) viewpoint for the universe to be repesented within it as each one quant of action according to the fundamental Planck constant. That approach implies the unification of gravity and entanglement correspondiing to the former or latter class of reference frames. An invariance, more general than Einstein's general covariance is to be involved as to both classes of reference frames unifying them. Its essence is the unification of the discrete and cotnitinuous (smooth). That idea underlies implicitly quantum mechanics for Bohr's principle that it study the system of quantum microscopic entities and the macroscopic apparatus desribed uniformly by the smmoth equations of classical physics. (shrink)

Este ensayo presenta una visión de conjunto del modo en el cual el «giro» (Kehre) hacia el pensamiento ontohistórico, a medidados de los años ’30, impacta sobre la concepción aleteiológica que, siguiendo a E. Lask y E. Husserl, Heidegger elabora desde comienzos de los años ‘20 hasta Sein und Zeit. Sobre esa base, se ofrece también un intento de caracterización de la reformulación eventualista-kairológica de la aleteiología presentada en Beiträge zur Philosophie. La caracterización propuesta se lleva a cabo con arreglo (...) a la distinción entre un nivel metahistórico de consideración, que corresponde al intento de pensar el seren su verdad en términos de la noción de «acontecimiento» (Ereignis), y un nivel propiamente histórico de consideración, que corresponde a la «hermenéutica de los dos comienzos». El pensar que medita históricamente el ser en su verdad sólo puede ser fiel a la intrínseca movilidad del ser mismo, si se ejerce en y desde la quietud de la contención, como temple animímico fundamental. (shrink)